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One of the earliest and loftiest conceptions of God is as the
Great Judge Eternal of the Universe; and so, the most exalted
function with which a man can be entrusted is the administra-
tion of justice to his fellow beings. Hence, it has been said
by a great philosopher that, in the performance of their official
duties, Judges "should imitate God, in whose seat they sit."'
It is doubtless because of these high and exacting require-
ments that, as was said in connection with Chief Justice Mar-
shall, "the world has produced fewer instances of truly great
Judges than it has of great men in almost any other department
of life." 2
The Judicial Office is as old as organized society. Origi-
nally, it was filled, in person, by the head of the community-
whether Priest, Patriarch or King--who proudly styled him-
self the "Fountain of Justice." Later on, as states became
more populous and society more complex, the administration
of justice had to be entrusted to personal representatives of the
sovereign, taken from the body of the people; and thus was
first formed the Judiciary, an institution, which, in one form
or another, is, and for time out of mind has been, common to
all governments.
The Judiciary, however, will be found to be very different
in different ages and in different countries, because, the freedom,
the virtue and the happiness of a People may be adequately
measured by the independence, integrity and prestige of its
Judiciary. Edmund Burke said: "It is the public justice that
holds the Community together;" 3 and certain it is that a truly
great Judge can exist only in an age of political liberty and
public morality, "in which he is the representative of the
abstract justice of the people in the administration of the law,
and is rewarded for the highest achievements of duty, by pro-
portionate admiration and reverence." 4
' Lord Bacon-Essay LVII of Judicature.
2 Horace Binney-Eulogy on John Marshall, 1835.
3 Speech on the Plan for Economical Reform, Feb. II, 178o.
4 Horace Binney-Eulogy on John Marshall, 1835.
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These observations are true of the Judiciary all over the
world, but in the United States, the Judiciary occupies a posi-
tion which, so far as any European Country is concerned, is
wholly unique.
Prior to the advent of what I may call the "American theory"
of the Judiciary, that arm of the government was wholly sub-
ject, and subordinate to the Legislative or Executive branch,
or to both; and was a mere creature of one or both of those
departments, according as one or the other, or both of them,
formed the dominant power in the State.
The independence of fhe Judiciary, as understood and prac-
ticed in America, did not necessarily grow, as some suppose,
out of the separation of governmental powers into Legislative,
Judicial and Executive. This classification exists necessarily,
in the very nature of those powers, and the mere fact that these
different functions of government are performed by separate
departments, would not necessitate all of those departments
being independent of each other; on the contrary, in England
(whose government Montesquieu cites as an ideal example of
the separation of these three departments) the legislative de-
partment-Parliament-is supreme in authority over both the
others.
In America was developed the theory that the ultimate
sovereignty in human society exists in the organized body of
the People as a whole, and in that body, alone, exists that divine
right to rule which some Monarchs still arrogate to themselves.
Now, it is, of course, physically impossible for all the powers
of Sovereignty, in a large State or Nation, to be personally
and directly exercised by the Sovereign itself, whether that
Sovereign be one man-the Monarch--or ten million men
organized as one body-the Nation itself. Hence, just as an
absolute monarch (in order to enable him to exercise the powers
and perform the duties of Sovereignty which he could not do
in person) would establish a government consisting of a Board
of Councilors to consider and make laws, a Board of Judges
to construe and administer them, and a Commander of his mili-
tary forces to execute the laws and defend the country from
foreign foes, and just as these persons would not act in their
own names, but in the name, and as the servants and representa-
tives of their Sovereign Monarch; so, even when that Sover-
eign is not a single Monarch, but the organized body of the
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whole People, acting as a Nation, yet it acts in the same way as
would a single Monarch; that is to say-being unable to per-
sonally and directly exercise all the powers of sovereignty, and,
acting and speaking through its written constitutions-through
which, alone, the Sovereign People can speak and act-it forms
a government, just like the single Monarch would do, composed
of a Legislative branch, to consider and make laws, a Judicial
branch to construe and administer them, and an Executive
branch to execute the laws and defend the country from its foes.
Neither one of these branches is sovereign any more than
was Field Marshall Oyama, the Sovereign of Japan, because he
commanded all of the Mikado's forces. Each branch of the
government is but the creature, representative, and servant of
the Sovereign which created it, and which, in Russia would be
the Czar, in Japan, the Mikado, and in the United States, the
American People.
While these governmental departments are all servants of
one master, that is to say, the real Sovereign, yet, within the
scope of their respective spheres, it is important that they be
independent of each other, lest one, obtaining mastery over its
fellow servants, should succeed in wresting the actual Sover-
eignty from their common master. To avoid the possibility
of this, the Sovereign People, whose servants the governmental
departments are, have, in the constitution which created the
government, prescribed certain checks and balances so as to
preserve the independence of these departments and to correct
an abuse of power by either of them, without necessitating a
resort to the Sovereign itself, that is, to the People as a Nation
in their primary capacity.
Now, this, in brief, is the American theory of government,
and one of its consequences is to place the Judiciary, as a co-
ordinate department of our government, on a full equality with
each of the other two departments, in the matter of their mutual
independence of each other and of the direct accountability of
each to their common master, the organized People of the
Nation, the true and only Sovereign of this country.
A result of this mutual independence and common account-
ability of the Legislative, Judicial and Executive Departments
of the government, has been to impose upon the American
Judiciary a function which had no prototype in the world, and,
to this day, has no counterpart in Europe; I refer to the func-
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tion of passing upon the constitutionality and therefore, the
validity, of statutes enacted by the Legislative branch, a func-
tion the most delicate and important with which the Judiciary
of any country was ever entrusted.
The history of the Supreme Court of the United States af-
fords the best, as well as the most notable, example of the
practical application and successful operation of this American
theory of the Judiciary, although that theory is of universal
application in the governments of the several States composing
the Union. "I take it as the highest encomium on this coun-
try," said Patrick Henry, "that the acts of the Legislature, if
unconstitutional, are liable to be opposed by the Judiciary."
The Supreme Court of the United States being by far the
most prominent court in this country-and for that matter,
the most notable tribunal in the world-it is not surprising
that foreigners should have supposed that this American idea
of the right-no, I will say, bounden duty--of a court to refuse
recognition to a statute on the ground of its unconstitutionality-
had its origin with the creation of the Supreme Court by the
Federal Convention of 1787. Accordingly, we find so learned
and accurate a writer as Sir Henry Maine referring to that
court as "a virtually unique creation of the founders of the
Constitution." 6 Even a notable American historian calls the
Supreme Court "the most original work accomplished by the
founders of the Constitution," 7 and says that that court had
"no prototype in history"--the peculiar characteristic referred
to by both of these writers being the right of the court to refuse
recognition to unconstitutional statutes.
But, as has been observed by others, this is not strictly cor-
rect. In fact, it may be said that great, valuable and enduring
institutions are never the work of invention but are always the
result of evolution; and this was true of the Supreme Court of
the United States.
It is true that the right and duty of the courts to refuse
recognition to an unconstitutional law would seem to follow as
a necessary consequence of the adoption of a written constitu-
tion; and yet it may be doubted if that consequence would have
followed in America, but for the peculiar situation and exper-
53 Elliot's Debates, p. 325.
6Popular Government, p. 217.
7 Taylor's Jur. & Pro. of Supreme Court, p. i, et seq.
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ience of the American people which gradually educated them
up to the point; because, in Switzerland, where they have a
written constitution also, the Legislative branch is expressly
made the sole judge of the constitutionality of its enactments
and the Judiciary is bound thereby.
In the American colonies, the legislatures fnever did have,
or claim, the absolute or unlimited power of legislation. These
colonies, for the most part, were mere business corporations,
gotten up for the purpose of trade and created by charters of
incorporation, which provided for their organization and gov-
ernment. These old charters first suggested the idea of our
written constitutions, which, in 1776 (though previously sug-
gested once or twice by philosophers), formed an entirely new
departure in actual governmental organization. Of course the
Legislative Assembly of a colony had no powers whatever,
except such as were conferred upon it by the charter of the
colony, or by some special enabling Act of Parliament, and so,
at an early day, the courts were called upon, from time to time,
to refuse recognition to the ultra vires enactments of Colonial
Assemblies, as in the case of Winthrop v. Lechemeres in which
the English Court held a statute passed by the Colonial Assembly
of Connecticut to be void as contrary to the charter of that
Colony and to English law.9
Accordingly, when the Colonies declared their independence,
and began to establish governments of their own, not only were
they (from their previous experience with the British Parlia-
ment and its claims of omnipotence) particularly fearful of
usurpation of authority by the Legislative branch, but they were
thoroughly accustomed to seeing that branch, as it had existed
in the colonies, subjected to the check of judicial inquiry into
the constitutionality of its acts. The early State courts there-
fore, did not fail to apply this check to the new State legis-
latures, just as the old Judiciary had done to the Colonial
assemblies.
As far back as 178o, Chief Justice Brearly of the New Jersey
Supreme Court, is said to have given it as the opinion of him-
self and associates that the judiciary had the right to pass upon
the constitutionality of statutes."0
8 Willoughby's Sup. Ct. of the U. S., p. 2.
9 Bryce's American Commonwealth, p. 234-4.
10 Holmes v. Walton (unreported) cited in State v. Parkhurst, 9 N. J.
Law Rep. Appendix p. 444; Sparks' Life of Governeur Morris, Vol. 3, p.
438; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Chap. III, p. 55, note I.
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In 1782, in the celebrated case of Commonwealth v. Caton,
before the Virginia Court of Appeals, the distinguished Edmund
Randolph, then Attorney General of that State, contended that
the court had no choice but to apply a duly enacted statute,.
whether it be unconstitutional or not; but, to this contention,
stout-hearted old Chancellor Wythe replied, with warmth, as
follows:
"If the whole Legislature (an act to be deprecated) should
attempt to overleap the bounds prescribed to them by the people,
I, in administering the public justice of the Country, will meet
the United Powers in my seat on this tribunal, and, pointing
to the Constitution, will say to them 'Here is the limit of your
authority and hither shall you go but no further'."11'
Accordingly, that court held that it did have the power to
declare any law void if unconstitutional. To the official report
of this case in the Virginia Reports, is appended the following
note by Daniel Call, the distinguished old reporter:
"It is said, that this was the first case in the United States,
where the question relative to the nullity of an unconstitutional
law was ever discussed before a judicial tribunal; and the firm-
ness of the judges (particularly of Mr. Wythe), was highly
honorable to them; and will always be applauded, as having,
incidentally, fixed a precedent whereon a general practice,
which the people of this country think essential to their rights
and liberty, has been established." 12
The matter, however, of declaring a statute unconstitutional
gave the judges sufficient concern to cause them in a later case
to address a remonstrance to the General Assembly of Virginia,
in which they said they had "found it unavoidable to consider
* * * whether the principles (expressed in the Legislative
Acts) of this case do not violate those of the Con-
stitution or form of government which the people in
1776 * * * established as the foundation of that govern-
ment which they judged necessary for the preservation
of their persons and their property, and, if such violations
were apparent, whether they (the Judges) had the power, and
it was their duty, to declare that the act must yield to the
Constitution? On this view of the subject (said they), the
following alternatives presented themselves to the Court:
either to decide those questions or to resign their offices. They
judged that a resignation would subject them to the reproach
of deserting their stations, and on that ground, found them-
selves obliged to decide, and in that decision to declare, that
' Commonwealth v. Caton, 4 Call. (Va.) p. 8.
12 Commonwealth v. Caton, 4 Call. (Va.) p. 21.
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the Constitution and the act are in opposition and cannot exist
together, and that the former must control the latter." 13
In 1786, a defence, on the ground of the alleged unconsti-
tutionality of a law, was made before the Rhode Island Court
in Trevitt v. Weeden,14 though I believe the case was decided
on some other point.
In 1787, the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Bayard v.
Singleton,15 declared a Statute unconstitutional and void. The
court, in that case, discussing its power to declare an act of the
Legislature unconstitutional, said, among other things:
"Another mode was proposed for putting the matter in con-
troversy on a more constitutional footing for a decision than
that of the motion under the aforesaid act. The court then,
after every reasonable endeavor had been used in vain for avoid-
ing a disagreeable difference between the Legislature and the
judicial powers of the State, at length, with much apparent re-
luctance, but with great deliberation and firmness, gave their
opinion separately, but unanimously for overruling the afore-
mentioned motion for the dismission of the said suits, in the
course of which the judges observed that the obligation of their
oaths and the duty of their office required them in that situation
to give their opinion on that important and momentous subject,
and that, notwithstanding the great reluctance they might feel
against involving themselves in a dispute with the Legislature
of the State, yet no object of concern or respect could come in
competition or authorize them to dispense with the duty they
owed the public, in consequence of the trust they were invested
with under the solemnity of their oaths; that they, therefore,
were bound to declare that they considered that whatever dis-
abilities the persons under whom the plaintiffs were said to
derive their title might justly have incurred against their main-
taining or prosecuting any suits in the courts of this State, yet
that such disabilities in their nature were merely personal, and
not by any means capable of being transferred to the present
plaintiffs, either by descent or purchase, and that these plain-
tiffs being citizens of one of the United States, or citizens of
this State, by the confederation of all the States which is to be
taken as a part of the law of the land, unrepealable by any act
of the General Assembly; that by the Constitution every citizen
had undoubtedly a right to a decision of his property by a trial
by jury, for that if the Legislature could take away this right,
and require him to stand condemned in his property without a
13 The Case of the Judges, 4 Call. (Va.) 135. See also The Advocate.
(a Minneapolis Law Journal) for May, 1889.
24 Storey on The Constitution, Vol. I, p. 226, note i, and p. 369, note I;
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Chap. VII, p. 229, note i.
15 1 Martin (N. C.) p. 42.
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trial, it might with as much authority require his life to be taken
away without a trial by jury, and that he should stand condemned
to die without the formality of any trial at all; that, if the
members of the General Assembly could do this, they might
with equal authority not only render themselves the legislators
of the State for life, without any further election of the people,
from thence transmit the dignity and authority of legislation
down to their heirs male forever; but that it was clear that no
acts they could pass could by any means repeal or alter the
Constitution, because, if they could do this, they would at the
same instant of time destroy their own existence as a Legisla-
ture, and dissolve the government thereby established. Conse-
quently, the Constitution (which the judicial power was bound
to take notice of as much as of any other law whatever), stand-
ing in full force as the fundamental law of the land, notwith-
standing the act on which the present motion was grounded,
the same act must, of course, in that instance, stand as abro-
gated and without any effect." 16
In a letter, dated 1788, from Mr. Cutting to Mr. Jeffer-
son, it is stated that several years before that, the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts had declared a Statute unconstitutional
and void.17
Thus, it will be seen that the idea of clothing the Judiciary
with the power of reviewing the constitutionality of legislative
acts, did not originate along with the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the Convention of 1787, but was an idea which
the American people, were, even at that time, already not only
familiar with but definitely attached to. See the very interesting
case of Bowman v. Middleton, i Bay 252, in which the Supreme
Court of South Carolina, in 1792, set aside a statute as being in
violation of Magna Charta and Common Right.
The first instance in which this power seems to have been
exercised by a Federal Court, was in Hayburn's case in 1791,
in which the Judges of a United States Circuit Court refused
to exercise functions imposed upon them by Act of Congress
because the Act was inconsistent with the Constitution.' 8
In 1803, the question came, for the first time, before the
Supreme Court of the United States, in the celebrated case of
Marbury v. Madison, in which Chief Justice Marshall decided
against the constitutionality of a statute which enlarged the
'8 Bayard v. Singleton, I Martin (N. C.) 42.
27 Bancroft's History of the Constitution, Vol. II, p. 472-3.
18 Hayburn's Case, 2 Dallas, 4o9. See also Van Home v. Dorrance
(1795), 2 Dallas, 3o4, especially Judge Patterson's opinion on p. 309, et seq.
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
jurisdiction of that court at the expense of the Executive Depart-
ment, and rendered a decision of such convincing and irrefut-
able logic, that the question was settled forever. In his opinion
he said:
"The powei-s of the Legislature are defined and limited. To
what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these
limits may, at any time, be passed, by those intended to be
restrained? * * * It is a proposition too plain to be con-
tested that either the Constitution controls any legislative act
repugnant to it or that the Legislature may alter the Constitution
by an ordinary act. Between these two alternatives there is
no middle ground. The Constitution is either a superior para-
mount law * * * or it is on a level with ordinary legislative
acts * * * If the former part of the alternative be true,
then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law;
if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd
attempts on the part of the people to limit a power, in its own
nature illimitable. 1 9
In 1816, in he great case of McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief
Justice Marshall, while sustaining a statute which had been
attacked on the ground that it was an undue assumption of
power by Congress, again expressed himself about the exercise
of this novel function of passing on the constitutionality of a
statute, saying:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited but con-
sist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitu-
tional.. * * * Should Congress in the execution of its
powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by the Constitu-
tions or should Congress, under pretext of executing its powers,
pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the
government, it would become the painful duty of this tribunal,
should a case requiring such decision come bef6re it, to say
that such an act was not the law of the land. But where the
law is not prohibited and is really calculated to effect any of
the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake to enquire
here into the degree of its necessity would be to pass the line
which circumscribes the judicial department and to tread on
legislative ground. This court disclaims all pretensions to
such a power." 20
When we consider these interpretations of this, the greatest
of judicial powers, and the impartial, disinterested and moderate
exercise of that power which led the Court to first overthrow
19 Marbury v. Madison, i Cranch, 176-7.20 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, p. 421.
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a statute designed to extend its own preogatives, and then to
sustain a statute alleged to be an undue assumption of power
by a co-ordinate branch of government, we may join with Wil-
liam Pinckney in saying that we see, in these omens, "a pledge
of immortality for the Union."
The first tribunal, in the nature of a Federal Court, that ever
existed in this country, was the old "Court of Appeals in Cases
of Capture," 21 created by the Continental Congress in 1779,
ten years before the Supreme Court of the United States came
into being.22 This court, which had cognizance only of prize
cases growing out of captures of hostile ships, was composed of
three Judges and was required to proceed in accordance with
International Law, and the respective States were called upon
to enforce its decrees.
Two years latcr, in 1781, by the old Articles of Confederation,
a second step was taken towards the establishment of a Federal
Judiciary, by giving Congress power to decide "all disputes and
differences now subsisting, or that hereafter may arise, between
two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or other
cause whatsoever." 23 It was provided, however, that this power
was to be exercised through commissioners or judges, to be
selected by Congress from each of the States. Upon the estab-
lishment of the Supreme Court of the United States, this power
among others was conferred upon it, and, as Chief Justice Taney
observed in the case of the State of Florida against the State
of Georgia (which was a suit brought in the Supreme Court
to settle the boundary line between those States): "A suit in
a court of justice between such parties and upon such a question
is without example in the jurisprudence of any other country." 24
Something like one hundred and twenty cases were, first and
last, decided by the two original tribunals just referred to.
Finally, in 1787, was created by the New Constitution, the
great Supreme Court of the United States, the origo et fons of
the real Federal Judiciary, and the most august, powerful, and
venerated judicial tribunal ever known in the world.
Judge Story says that "the lack of a separate Judiciary had
been one of the vital defects of the Confederation." 25 Accord-
21 i31 U. S. Appendix, p. XIX.
22 Taylor's Jur. & Pro. Sup. Ct. pp. 7-8.
23 Taylor's Jur. & Pro. Sup. Ct. pp. 8-9; 131 U. S. Appendix p. XLIX.
24 Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 494.
25 Story on Constitution, Sec. 1574.
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ingly, each of the four drafts of the proposed Constitution,
which, by Randolph, Pinckney, Paterson and Hamilton, respec-
tively, were submitted to the Convention of 1787, contained pro-
visions for a regular Federal Judiciary system.
At one time, it was proposed to authorize Congress to nega-
tive unconstitutional acts passed by state legislatures; because,
as earnestly pointed out by Mr. Madison, control over state
legislation violative of the Federal Constitution, is absolutely
essential to the preservation of the Nation. But, as was pointed
out by Rodger Sherman, Congress is not the proper body to exer-
cise this control; "for," said he, "it is a wrong principle to
assume that a State Statute violative of the Federal Constitution
could be valid or operative for any purpose, unless or until
negatived or repealed by a subsequent Act of Congress." 28
Thus, it fell naturally and properly to the Judiciary to exer-
cise this control by refusing recognition to any State statute-
just as it must, to any act of Congress-which is in violation
of the Federal Constitution.
The first case in which the Supreme Court of the United
States decided a State statute to be unconstitutional, was United
States v. Peters,27 from Pennsylvania in I8O9.
When the Judiciary Article of the Federal Constitution came
from the Committee on Detail of the Convention of 1787, it gave
to the Supreme Court jurisdiction in "all cases arising under
the laws passed by the Legislature of the United States ;,,28 but
the Convention changed this to read: All cases, in law and
equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United
States and Treaties made, or which shall be made under their
authority." 29
While the Constitution was pending before the people for its
adoption, it was, in some instances, urged against its adoption
that this clause was too vague and general.30 To this objection,
Mr. Deane, in the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, made
reply as follows:
"For my part, I know but two ways in which the laws can
be executed by any government * * * The first mode is by
coercion by military force, and the second is coercion through
265 Elliot's Debates, pp. 321-2.
275 Cranch, 115.
28 l Elliot's Debates, p. 229.
295 Elliot's Debates, pp. 483, 563.
304 Elliot's Debates, p. 136.
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the Judiciary. With respect to coercion by force, I shall sup-
pose that it is so supremely repugnant to the principles of jus-
tice and the feelings of a free people, that no man will support
it. It must, in the end, terminate in the destruction of the lib-
erties of the people. I take it therefore that there is no rational
way of enforcing the laws but by the instrumentality of the
Judiciary * * * Without a Judiciary, the injunctions of the
Constitution may be disobeyed and the positive regulations
neglected and contravened." 3'
The provision of the Federal Constitution for the establish-
ment of a complete Federal Judiciary, was given effect by the
great Judiciary Act, drawn by Oliver Ellsworth and passed by
Congress in 1789. This Act, by which the flesh was put upon
the skeleton created by the Constitution, is justly regarded as in
the forefront of excellence in statutory draftsmanship. When
first organized, the Supreme Court of the United States con-
sisted of a Chief Justice and five Associate Justices; but the
number of Associate Justices is now eight.
The following, in the order named, have been the Chief
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:
John Jay (a great lawyer and statesman, of whom Mr. Web-
ster beautifully said: "When the spotless ermine of the judicial
robe fell upon John Jay, it touched nothing less spotless than
itself") ; John Rutledge (who was appointed, but not confirmed) ;
William Cushing (who resigned within about a week after con-
firmation) ; Oliver Ellsworth (draftsman of the Judiciary Act of
1789); John Marshall (the greatest of all judgeb) ; Roger B.
Taney, Salmon P. Chase; Morrison R. Waite, and Melville
W. Fuller.
At first, the Court had very little business; but, as the country
grew and prospered, the business of that great tribunal increased
to such an extent that nine intermediate Courts of Appeal have
been organized to relieve it of the less important matters.
During their respective terms as Chief Justice, and without
resigning that office, Jay served as Minister to England, and
Ellsworth as Minister to France.
At its first session, the Supreme Court of the United States
had not a single case upon its docket; from 1790 to i8oo there
were only six cases decided by that Court involving Constitu-
tional questions; and when Chief Justice Marshall came uporr
the bench he found only ten cases awaiting decision.
814 Elliot's Debates, p. I55.
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With Marshall, however, the Supreme Court, though twelve
years old, may be said to have really begun its life. He was
Chief Justice thirty-four years.
It may be said that the Constitution formed the skeleton of
this Nation, that Cbngress put on the flesh, and that the Supreme
Court shaped the figure and regulated the growth. In this great
work, Marshall has probably done more than all the other mem-
bers of that court from the beginning to the present time; and
in the opinion of many, this country owes more to him than
to any other single man, with the possible exception of Wash-
ington himself.
It is difficult for us to realize the magnitude of the task which,
upon his appointment as Chief Justice, he undertook, so dif-
ferent are present conditions from those which at that time
existed. The Federal Government was then practically begin-
ning its existence, and almost nothing had been done in develop-
ing our constitutional law. The scanty decisions of the Supreme
Court, up to that time, were nearly all contained in a single
volume of the official reports, and of those decisions, few dealt
with constitutional questions. The people, as Edmund Randolph
expressed it, were still "in the infancy of the-science of con-
stitutions." 32 And so, with no precedents to guide him, and
with little or no aid to be derived from books, he may be said
to have created our system of constitutional law, laying its
foundations broad and deep. Other judges have won renown in
administering technical or general principles of law, or in this
or that department of jurisprudence as applied to controversies
between individuals; but, in the department of constitutional
law-law as applied to the science and institutions of govern-
ment-Marshall stands unrivalled and supreme. His judgments,
so fraught with deepest consequences to the American people,
are justly ranked amongst the highest efforts of the human
mind, and are distinguished as well for their simplicity and
lucidity of style as for their irresistible logic and profound
wisdom.
He believed in the intelligence, conservatism and patriotism
of the American people, and did not hesitate to interpret the
Constitution as creating "a government of the People, by the
People and for the People," and not merely as a continuing
league of States such as was the old Confederation. He main-
32 5 Elliot's Debates, p. 126.
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tained that, while the national government is one of enumerated
powers, the Constitution should be construed not strictly, but
reasonably, so as to give due effect to the words employed.
And-so, by his interpretation of the Constitution, he imparted
to it life and vigor-finding it mere paper, he left it a Chart for
the government of a Nation.
But, while maintaining the supremacy of the Constitution, as
reasonably interpreted, he not less clearly recognized the rights
of the states. "In America," he said, "the powers of sover-
eignty are divided between the government of the Union and
those of the states. They are each sovereign with respect to
the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect
to the objects committed to the other." 33 He perceived that an
aggregation of states, each controlling its domestic concerns
under a common head, invested with limited powers for
national purposes, is the only system adapted to the government
of a vast territory like ours, and that, therefore, the states and
the United States are component parts of one great whole, the
one being as needful as the other; or, as an eminent writer hap-
pily expresses it, "the Union without self-existent States is as
a harp without strings.; the States without union are as chords
that are unstrung"-a principle recognized by the Supreme
Court in Texas v. White,3" decided in 1869, where the Court
speaks of "an indestructible Union composed of indestructible
States."
While the great work of Chief Justice Marshall is recognized
throughout the world, yet it is a source of pride and pleasure
to every American to know that this great Court has at all times
been composed of men who were noted for their ability, charac-
ter and integrity, and the high reputation of the presiding
officers of that Court has at all times been maintained, the dis-
tingnished American who now presides over that tribunal being
in every way a worthy successor of his illustrious predecessors.
While Marshall was Chief Justice, eleven hundred and six
cases were decided by the Supreme Court, of which he wrote the
opinions in five hundred and nineteen. Out of the sixty-two
cases involving constitutional questions which the Court decided
while he was Chief Justice, thirty-six of the opinions were
written by him. These figures may give some idea of the extent,
3!McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 410.
4 7 Wallace, p. 7oo.
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but not of the importance of this great man's public services.
The extent to which he dominated that Court throughout his long
term of service may be shown by the fact that in only eight cases
did he file dissenting opinions.3 5
In the five years from 1875 to i88o, the Supreme Court
heard and decided nineteen hundred and fifty-five cases; and
at the beginning of i888 there were twenty-five hundred and
seventy-one cases pending on its docket. Since then, its burdens
have been relieved by the labors of nine Circuit Courts of
Appeals, but still the Supreme Court of the United States is one
of the hardest worked Courts in the world.
In the sessions of that great tribunal, quietness, solemnity,
dignity and rapidity characterize its proceedings in which re-
spects, as indeed in all others, it is a model for the courts of all
the world.
The Supreme Court, as the capstone of the Federal Judiciary,
has well earned its title of "Bulwark of the Constitution," in
repelling attacks-sometimes open, sometimes insidious-upon
that venerable instrument, that Ark of the Nation's Covenant.
In doing this, it has defended States Rights from invasion, as
vigorously and as effectively as it has overthrown assaults upon
the Federal prerogatives. It has indeed proven itself to be the
"balance wheel of the Republic."
In the earlier days of our National life, when the newly
formed Federal Government was surrounded by powerful states,
like an infant King surrounded by fierce, jealous and turbulent
barons, its strong, faithful and efficient guardian was the
Supreme Court. But, when at the close of the Civil War, the
Federal power was unduly exalted, and many would have
trampled upon the reserved rights of the states, this same great
tribunal interposed its powerful shield for the protection of the
real rights of the states, saying as it did in Texas v. White:
"The preservation of the States and the maintenance of their
government are as much within the design and care of the
Constitution, as the preservation and the maintenance of the
National Government." 36
And, when, even in the midst of Civil War, ill-advised
men, flushed with recent victory and intoxicated with power,
35 Political Science Asso'n of University of Michigan, Conslitutional
History of U. S. as Seen in the Development of Am. Law-a course of
lectures; The Federal Supreme Court, by Judge T. M. Cooley.
36 Texas v. White, 7 Wallace, 725.
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sought to stretch forth the mighty hand of the Federal Govern-
ment to illegally seize the property of a private individual, even
though he were one of the avowed adversaries of that very
Government, the Supreme Court, in the great case of United
States v. Lee, decided in 1882, interposed its protecting aegis,
proclaiming the fact that America is the land of Law and not
of Violence, and that not even the greatest government on earth
can override the constitutional rights of a free American citizen.
In the course of the masterly opinion of the Court in that case,
Mr. Justice Miller (esteemed by many to rank in ability next
to the great Marshall himself), discussing the Constitutional
provisions for the protection of the individual, said:
"These provisions for the security of the rights of the citizen
stand in the Constitution in the same connection and upon the
same ground, as they regard his liberty and his property, and
it cannot be denied that both were intended to be enforced by
the Judiciary." 37
Further, it was said that no kingly principle can limit the
operation of the constitutional guaranties; that no man in this
country is so high that he is above the law; that no officer of the
law may set that law at defiance with impunity; that all the
officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are
creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it-a sentiment,
let me add, worthy to be written in letters of gold, and placed
in every American -home!
Thus we have seen the great head of the Federal Judiciary
Department in Marbury v. Madison,38 declining to permit its
own powers to be unduly enlarged-in McCulloch v. Maryland 89
repelling an attack upon the powers of a co-ordinate branch of
the Government-in U. S. v. Peters, 4 and Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee,41 defending the Federal Government from attacks by the
States-in Texas v. White,42 repelling invasion of State's Rights
by the Federal Government-and in U. S. v. Lee,43 protecting
individuals from oppression by the Government. In the light
37 U. S. v. Lee, io6 U. S., 22o.
88 i Cranch, 137.
394 Wheaton, 316.
4o5 Cranch, II5.
41 I Wheaton, 304.
42 7 Wallace, 700.
43 io6 U. S., 196.
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of such a record, we can truly say that the glory of the American
Republic is its Judiciary!
Thus far, I have spoken chiefly of the Federal Judiciary. I
would not, however, be understood as wanting in appreciation of
the splendid contributions to our jurisprudence, and to the main-
tenance of the Constitution, by State Judges. The names of Tay-
lor, Ruffin, Pearson, Gaston, Bynum, Reed, Pendleton, Tucker,
Staples, Kent, Shaw, Walworth, Gibson, Cooley, and many others
who have adorned the Bench of their respective states, will ever
be venerated and held in grateful rememberance. Indeed, the his-
tory of American Law could not well be written without refer-
ring to the work of those eminent jurists.
It is a great mistake to suppose that the duty of expounding
the Constitution has been devolved upon the Federal Courts
alone. From the organization of the Government, that duty
has been shared by the courts of the several states, and in many
other matters these courts have exercised, under the law, a con-
current jurisdiction with the courts of the Union.
And here it is appropriate to say that as the judges are
recruited from the Bar, whatever honor or renown the
Judiciary has won, belongs to the legal profession. The most
celebrated judgments that have ever been rendered from the
Bench were rendered after able and helpful arguments from
the Bar. Think of the invaluable contributions to our juris-
prudence in the forensic arguments of Hamilton, Webster, and
many other brilliant ornaments of the Bar, whose names are
familiar to us all!
The Judge, if such a one there be, who imagines that he has
no need of the aid of counsel, is to be pitied, as are the unfortu-
nate litigants before him, or rather, I should say, the unfortunate
victims of his stupidity and conceit.
To say, moreover, in this connection, that not only has the
American Bar won imperishable fame in the Forum and in the
Senate, but that in every great movement in our history, which
has redounded to the public good and the public honor, the
leaders have nearly always been lawyers, would be but to affirm
the well-known facts of history which no one can refute.
"Justice," said Mr. Webster, "is the great interest of man
on earth; it is the ligament which holds civilized beings and
civilized nations together. Wherever her temple stands, and
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so long as it is duly honored, there is a foundation for social
security, general happiness and the improvement and progress
of our race." 44
If we are to avoid anarchy or civil war, the right to authori-
tatively construe the Constitution and settle all conflicts with
it, must be lodged in some department of the Government. With
this tremendous, and therefore, delicate and dangerous, power,
no department could be so wisely or so safely trusted as the
Judiciary.
I say "wisely," not because judges have any more wisdom
than other men, but because the nature of their calling with-
draws them from the active affairs of life, the passions gener-
ated by which so often becloud or overthrow men's judgment;
because long years of considering and deciding controversies
makes them more dispassionate, clear-minded and discriminat-
ing than they would otherwise be; because the machinery of a
judicial tribunal, insuring a full, quiet hearing for both sides
and ample time for calm consideration, tends, as far as human
agencies can contribute, to insure fair, just and wise decisions;
and because the right of appeal from one court to another,
which exists in practically all important cases, insures cooling
time, reflection and the checking of the decision's soundness by
the independent judgment of a new set of men.
I say the Judiciary is the "safest" department of Government
to which this great power can be entrusted, not because judges
are better or more trustworthy than other men, but because,
in the nature of things, the Judiciary Department is powerless
to usurp the powers of either the Legislative or Executive
branches.
In the language of Alexander Hamilton, the Judiciary "may
be truly said to have neither force nor will, but merely judicial
judgment and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the Exec-
utive arm, for the efficacious exercise even of this faculty." 4
Or, as Professor Willoughby has so well put it:
"With no executive force at its back, and without means of
extending its influence either by patronage or command of the
public revenues, it relies for the execution of its decrees, upon
44Webster's Address on Mr. Justice Story, 3 Story's Rep- VII (Pre-
face).
45 Federalist, p. 483.
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the legal spirit and reverence for law of the people, and upon
their confidence in its justice and their faith in its wisdom." 46
The judge, then, who, by his life, would betray this confidence,
or by his unworthy deeds pollute the temple of justice, or destroy
the reverence of the People for their laws, let him be Anathema,
for, indeed, as Chief Justice Marshall said: "the greatest
scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and
sinning people, is an ignorant, a corrupt or a dependent
Judiciary."47
It is a difficult task to undertake to define the relation which
the Federal courts sustain to those courts whose duty it is to
enforce the laws enacted by the Legislatures of the several
states, and lack of space forbids that I should undertake any-
thing like an elaborate discussion of this phase of the question.
However, if the Federal Statutes are construed in the spirit in
which they are written, and the powers of the Federal courts
exercised with due regard to the comity which exists between
the Federal and State courts, there can and should be no con-
flict between these courts.
In discussing this question as to the extent of the power of
the State to control the procedure of its Courts, Justice Brewer,
in the case of Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S., p. 172, says:
"The State has full control over the procedure in its courts,
both civil and criminal cases, subject only to the qualification that
such procedure must not work a denial of fundamental rights
or conflict with specific and applicable provisions of the Federal
Constitution."
If the law is enforced in accordance with these rules, we have
two independent jurisdictions operating in the same territory,
performing functions of the highest importance to the people,
and at the same time administering laws that are essential to
the peace and good order of our country without producing the
slightest friction. These systems of jurisprudence are in perfect
harmony with the theory of our government and afford a strik-
ing illustration of the stability of our institutions.
That there should be any question about the propriety of a
non-resident seeking relief in a Federal Court in .a case where
"6Supreme Court of U. S., p. io2.
47 Debates of Va. Convention, 1829, p. 61g.
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it is sought to deprive such party of his property in violation of
the Constitution of the United States, is amazing, and clearly
indicates either a misconception of the law or a disposition to
ignore the plain provisions of the Constitution under which we
live and by which the State as well as the Federal courts are
governed in the administration of the law.
The framers of the Constitution, with a prophetic vision,
foresaw the wonderful growth and development of this country,
and in anticipation of such growth and development wisely
provided in the Constitution for the establishment of Federal
tribunals with a view of enabling citizens to enforce in such
tribunals the rights to which they are entitled in their inter-
course with their fellow men in the large commercial trans-
actions that have grown up as a part of our development as a
Nation. These tribunals have been resorted to for that purpose
without interruption ever since the establishment of the Federal
Judiciary and until recently no one has seriously questioned the
propriety and wisdom of such procedure.
However, within the past two years some have sought to
create the impression that the institution of a suit in a Federal
Court by a non-resident for the purpose of enforcing a right
guaranteed under the Constitution is in the nature of an invasion
of State's Rights. Much has been said in regard to state sover-
eignty. Newspapers and state officials have undertaken in some
instances to, determine these questions by methods unknown to
judicial procedure, and if such policy had prevailed, it would
have resulted in the demoralization of public and private business
and would have been in utter disregard of the rights of indi-
viduals guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.
It cannot be successfully asserted that there is an interference
with State's Rights so long as the courts of the United States
do no more than exercise the judicial power conferred upon
such courts by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution. In
the case of Smythe v. Ames, 169 U. S., 466, the Court, in refer-
ring to the duties of the Federal Court, among other things
said:
"The duty rests upon all courts, Federal and State, when
their jurisdiction is properly invoked, to see to it that no rights
secured by the supreme law of the land is impaired or destroyed
by legislation. This function and duty of the Judiciary dis-
tinguishes the American system from all other systems of govern-
ment. The perpetuity of our institutions and the liberty which
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is enjoyed under them depend, in no small degree, upon the
power given the Judiciary to declare null and void all legislation
that is clearly repugnant to the supreme law of the land."
It is inconceivable that a Circuit Court of the United States
should be powerless to afford a remedy to one who seeks to
assert a right which is guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States. The Eleventh Amendment, as well as the end
to be obtained by the adoption of the same, shows conclusively
that those who were responsible for its adoption never dreamed
that it could be used to deprive an American citizen of a substan-
tial right conferred upon him by the Constitution of the United
States. This amendment being a part of the Constitution, must
be construed so as to give full force and effect to each and every
provision of the instrument of which it forms a part. Any
other construction would be to practically nullify that clause
of the Constitution which provides that no State shall pass any
laws impairing the obligation of contracts, as well as the Four-
teenth Amendment which, among other things, provides that
"no State shall make or enforce any law which will abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without duie process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Strange as it may seem, many of the individuals who profess
to favor states' rights are insistent that Congress should legislate
so as to regulate the control or management and operation of all
corporations whose business is interstate. They also advocate
the passage of a child labor law by Congress and are strong
supporters of the employers' liability law which was passed by
the last Congress. Thus we find that those who now advocate
states' rights are in favor of principles that are antagonistic to
the views entertained by those who advocated states' rights in
the days of Calhoun.
The theory upon which our government was founded is that
the Constitution of the United States is supreme and controlling
in all matters. It is the supreme law of the land which should
be obeyed until the People deem it expedient to modify the same.
Every official, state or federal, is required, before entering upon
the discharge of the duties of his office, to take an oath to sup-
port and maintain the Constitution of the United States and
the laws made in pursuance thereof, and the state official who
YALE LAW JOURNAL
takes this oath among other things is required to state that he
will support the Constitution and laws of the State not incon-
sistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Therefore, it is as much the duty of the state official to support
the courts of the United States in the enforcement of their
decrees in regard to matters over which they have jurisdiction,
as it is the duty of the Judges of such courts to enforce the law
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the
United States. To hold that a State, through its Legislature,
has the power to enact laws in conflict with the Constitution of
the United States by which an individual is to be deprived of
either his life, liberty or property, would result in chaos and
confusion and defeat the very purpose of those who framed the
Constitution in the first instance.
When we come to consider the provisions of the Constitution
to which I have referred, we can fully appreciate the wisdom of
the framers of that instrument in providing for the establish-
ment of tribunals in which the rights thus guaranteed may be
asserted. The Federal courts are in no sense of the word for-
eign tribunals. They are presided over by Judges selected from
among the people of the territory wherein the courts are estab-
lished, and the jurors are drawn by a non-partisan jury com-
mission from the citizenship of such territory, and every official
of the court is a citizen of such territory, and ample means are
provided by which litigants may carry their cases from such
courts to a court of appeals, and in some instances directly to
the Supreme Court, thus affording every opportunity and facility
to the citizen that could possibly be afforded in any state court.
Strange to say, there are those who at this day and time insist
that the courts have no power to declare an act of the Legisla-
tive branch invalid when it is in conflict with the National or
State Constitution, and in many instances unwarranted attacks
are made upon the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Courts of the States as well as the other Courts of the
Nation and States.
The individual who insists that the Courts have no power to
declare an act of the National or $tate Legislature invalid pro-
claims a doctrine no less dangerous to the public welfare than
the conduct of him who by corrupt means seeks to pollute the
fountain of justice so as to prevent a fair and impartial con-
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sideration of questions which may be presented to the courts for
consideration.
The Judges of this country, with rarest exceptions, have been
exempt from criticism calculated to affect their integrity. This
is a splendid tribute to the wisdom and foresight of the framers
of the Constitution, and while it is a guarantee of the stability
of our institutions, at the same time it reflects great credit upon
the character of the American people.
To adopt the theory of those who profess to believe that the
courts are without authority to declare a legislative act uncon-
stitutional, would be to reverse the uniform policy of this govern-
ment from its foundation until this good hour. It would be
the accomplishment of that which was declared otherwise when
the Constitution was adopted, and which has been finally and
forever settled by the highest courts, both State and National.
There is a growing tendency on the part of many to incline
to theories that are wholly inconsistent with our distinctive form
of government, and while at present they are making but little
headway, it should be constantly borne in mind that "eternal
vigilance is the price of liberty." It might with equal propriety
be said that the perpetuity of our institutions depends upon the
vigilance of those who believe in the doctrines enunciated by
Washington, Hamilton, Madison, Jefferson, Chief Justice Mar-
shall, and the other patriots to whose wisdom and courage we
are indebted for the splendid heritage which we now enjoy.
Under our system of government a citizen may lie down at
night and rest undisturbed as to the safety of his life and prop-
erty, and this ideal condition is due to the fact that the strong
arm of the law prevails and is supreme on every inch of soil
beneath the Stars and Stripes. This condition was made pos-
sible as a result of the fair and impartial administration of
justice by a Judiciary whose sole ambition was to enforce the
law in accordance with the written Constitution drafted by
those who sacrificed their all in order that their descendants
might be exempt from the acts of tyranny and injustice which
inspired them to take the initiative in a movement the like of
which in magnitude and importance had never been undertaken
by any people on the face of the earth.
I firmly believe that an overwhelming majority of the Ameri-
can people fully appreciate the strength of our Government as
188 YALE LAW JOURNAL
now constituted, as well as the many blessings that flow there-
from, and while we are occasionally confronted by the spas-
modic efforts of those who know not what they do, and whose
counsel, if heeded, would disrupt our Government, nevertheless
I have an abiding faith in the American people, and I cannot
believe that the time will ever come when a government of the
People, for the People and by the People shall perish from the
face of the earth.
I. C. Pritchard.
